Russia’s aggressive strategies in the last few decades – from military actions to cyber-attacks and energy blackmail – have made a profound impact on European security. These actions have encouraged the EU and NATO to increase defence, strengthen cohesion, and reveal weaknesses in Europe’s energy and information infrastructures. Dramatic wake-up calls have included major events such as the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In both instances, Europe reacted with sanctions, new defence pledges, and heightened military preparedness. Meanwhile, Russian utilisation of “hybrid” instruments – cyber-attacks, disinformation, sabotage of critical infrastructure and political subversion – has compelled Europe to make itself more resilient.
The 2022 Invasion of Ukraine and Escalation
The 24 February 2022 invasion of Ukraine was another even deeper turning point. This unprovoked conflict led to near-consensual Western outrage and an unprecedented outpouring of support for Ukraine. Within days, the EU imposed comprehensive new sanctions on Russia and started to directly reinforce Ukraine’s defence.
At the European Union level, the war spurred significant policy changes. EU leaders endorsed a Strategic Compass on 22–23 March 2022 – a 10-year security strategy – weeks after the invasion. The Compass outlined ambitions for increased military preparedness and coordination.
NATO itself moved further towards unification. Only months after the invasion, Finland (which borders Russia along 1,300 km of territory) sought to join NATO and was officially welcomed in April 2023. Sweden’s equivalent application was welcomed by all member states (except Hungary) by early 2024. As NATO officials pointed out, these expansions “strengthen NATO defences in the Baltic Sea region in front of Russia.”.
NATO leaders had already concurred in December 2022 on major enhancements to troop and equipment deployments throughout Eastern Europe. During mid-2023, the Hague Summit concluded a fresh defence commitment: all members should allocate 5% of GDP to security by 2035 (3.5% on conventional defence and 1.5% on climate, cyber and civil defence). In reality, members have since competed to increase military expenditure to achieve even the 2% of GDP benchmark.
NATO–Russia Relations in Crisis
In short, Russia’s actions have “reset” NATO–Russia relations to a Cold War footing. All major cooperation channels between NATO and Moscow have been severed since 2014. The 1997 NATO–Russia Council (intended as a forum for dialogue) has met only sporadically on basic security matters, and even UN arms-control forums are deadlocked. The once‐promising agenda of NATO–Russia partnership (anti-terrorism, counternarcotics, etc.) collapsed. Instead, both sides have returned to open deterrence and strategic rivalry. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept and other official statements reaffirm Russia as the “most significant and direct threat” to alliance security (something avoided in recent decades). Likewise, Russia’s 2021 National Security Strategy explicitly portrays the West as a principal adversary, and Russian officials have warned that any NATO buildup on its borders will elicit a response.
Energy Dependencies and Leverage
One of Russia’s oldest levers in Europe has been energy. Before the Ukraine war, roughly 40–45% of the EU’s natural gas imports came from Russia (via pipelines like Nord Stream, Yamal, and Druzhba). Moscow had often used gas pricing and exports as a political tool. The war brought a break in this arrangement. Immediately in 2022, Russia slashed pipeline deliveries to Western Europe and cut off supplies to unfriendly governments. In response, the EU launched its REPowerEU plan (May 2022) to diversify suppliers and accelerate renewables. The results were dramatic: by 2025, the Russian share of EU gas imports had fallen to about 19%. The EU has since sought to phase down all Russian oil and gas: it banned Russian coal in 2022, put a price cap on oil in 2023, and committed to ending pipeline gas imports by 2027. New regasification terminals (LNG) and pipeline links to Norway and North Africa have been prioritised. In May 2025, the European Commission issued a “roadmap” to fully eliminate dependency on Russian energy, urging all member states to prepare phase-out plans.
This energy crisis has deep security implications. It forced Europe to view energy infrastructure (pipelines, grids, nuclear supply chains) as part of its vulnerability. The September 2022 explosions on the Nord Stream pipelines – widely seen as sabotage – underscored that critical infrastructure could be targeted. Europe’s drive to cut Russian energy has also accelerated debates over climate and industrial policy (for example, longer lifetimes for EU gas pipelines, or joint strategic reserves of fuel). In sum, the once-thorny issue of Russian energy dependence has become a top strategic priority: Europe is now scrambling to secure alternative supplies and to insulate its economy from Russian coercion.
Cyber Warfare and Hybrid Threats
Europe has formally recognised a Russian hybrid threat. For instance, the EU Council has denounced an escalation of Kremlin-sponsored campaigns since Feb 2022, such as “sabotage, disruption of critical infrastructure, cyberattacks, information manipulation and interference” targeting EU countries. Recent Baltic Sea incidents – various suspicious cable and pipeline damages – have been generally understood as part of the trend (see below). Russia is also blamed for peddling misinformation through social media and state media to sway European elections and popular opinion. The response of European governments has been to boost cyber defence and resilience.
The EU took a new Cybersecurity Directive (NIS2) in late 2022 to enhance reporting of incidents and protection in all sectors. In 2023–2024, the EU set up “Hybrid Rapid Response Teams” and increased the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) mechanism to facilitate countermeasures. It also enacted legislation to strengthen key infrastructure (energy, transport, health, communications) against sabotage. NATO, in turn, has activated “cyber rapid-reaction forces” under Allied Command operations and integrated hybrid threats into exercises and planning. In brief, Moscow’s cyber/hybrid warfare has forced Europe to invest in power network protection, telecom and pipeline networks protection, as well as public resilience to disinformation and cybersecurity. A Finnish coast guard officer on the sea.
European militaries and coast guards are becoming ever more vigilant for hybrid sabotage: recent mysterious disruption of undersea electricity and communications cables in the Baltic and North Seas has been widely blamed (at least partially) on Russian covert action. These hybrid attacks typically combine cyber intrusions (to access or deceive) with physical vandalism or sabotage, and are designed to create fear and doubt. EU officials have labelled such occurrences as “a new reality” of ocean insecurity and are acquiring spare cables, drones, and improved surveillance for safeguarding this key infrastructure.
European Defense Posture and Alliance Behavior
As a consequence of these threats, European defence posture and spending have surged. EU member states collectively spent €326 billion on defence in 2024 – up by more than 30% since 2021. This spending jump reflects more troops, modern equipment, and larger military budgets across Europe. A review of NATO data found that, in aggregate, European and Canadian defence spending has risen from ~1.66% of GDP in 2022 to 2.02% in 2024. Today, 23 of NATO’s 31 members meet or exceed the alliance guideline of 2% GDP, compared to only 6 members in 2021. Many governments are investing heavily in munitions, air defences, and mobility. For instance, EU defence investments (procurement and R&D) hit a record €102 billion in 2024 (over 30% of total spend), comfortably above the agreed 20% benchmark.
Military deployments and exercises have likewise ramped up. Allied forces regularly conduct large-scale drills on Europe’s eastern flank. In early 2024, Poland hosted Exercise Dragon-24, during which dozens of battle tanks and infantry vehicles from nine NATO countries marshalled on the Vistula River banks. This was part of Steadfast Defender 2024, NATO’s largest exercise in decades. It involved ~90,000 troops from 31 NATO allies plus Sweden, along with 50+ naval vessels, 80+ aircraft and over 1,100 combat vehicles, all practising rapid deployment and defence of Europe. These drills – the biggest since the Cold War – send a clear message of deterrence to Russia.
Alliance behaviour has also shifted. NATO has strengthened burden-sharing among members: several countries (especially in Eastern Europe) now host more US and allied forces on a persistent basis. The US has rotated additional brigades into Poland and the Baltics under Atlantic Resolve. European nations are committing to joint procurement projects, like the EUR 100 billion European Defence Fund for collaborative R&D. Notably, two formerly non-aligned countries have joined NATO. Finland became a member on 4 April 2023, and Sweden’s accession was ratified by the alliance in January 2024. As NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg observed, Sweden’s entry would “enhance NATO defences in the Baltic Sea region facing Russia”.
Political Unity and Division
Russia’s campaign has united Europe while also revealing the boundaries of cohesion.
On the one hand, the EU and NATO have shared broadly a united front: all prominent Western powers denounced the invasion and levied economic sanctions against Russia. EU and NATO institutions coordinated sanctions, weapons shipments to Ukraine, and diplomatic encouragement. In Brussels and Washington alike, leaders emphasise that their solidarity is “unequivocal” in the face of Moscow’s aggression. For instance, EU leaders in March 2025 supported security guarantees to Ukraine, and Hungary alone withheld its approval. The European Parliament also welcomed the joint effort as a demonstration of “leadership, resolve and vision” during wartime. Meanwhile, Russia’s influence efforts and war weariness have exposed cracks.
Hungary, led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, has been an exception, resisting some sanctions and disputing the supply of Ukraine. (Russia openly threatened Hungary that strengthening NATO infrastructure in Hungary or neighbouring countries would be countered.) Turkey also had its agenda – it finally welcomed Sweden into NATO only after it made concessions on its security requirements. In Western Europe, far-right and far-left political parties have at times echoed Kremlin positions or called for halting arms deliveries. As of 2025, however, such voices continue to be marginalised in the government. In the EU, opinion polls everywhere register firm majorities supporting Ukraine and avoiding Russian aggression. One central element of consensus has been sanctions and political support: the EU adopted package after package of sanctions on Russian exports, oligarchs, and banks in quick time.
It also accepted war refugees (more than 7 million Ukrainians to date) and integrated Ukraine into EU supply chains as far as possible. NATO’s Article 3 on national resilience – and the EU’s own Mechanism for Civil Protection – have been mobilised to assist allies in managing any spillover. While unity is not complete, the overall effect has been to bring the West together, turning centuries of burden‐sharing fatigue on its head. Briefly put, Europe’s political position hardened: the majority of its governments now consider Russia a threat to the system and are united in the reinforcement of collective defence and assistance to Ukraine.
Implications for Future European Security Policy
The consequence is that all Russian policies have irreversibly redrawn Europe’s security map. Defensive militarisation is the new reality. European governments are planning on the assumption that security threats can emanate from the east whenever they want. Upcoming EU and NATO policy reports will institutionalise Russia as the foremost threat, allocating resources in the same line. For instance, the NATO leadership has already pledged to meet a long-term objective of a 5% GDP spend by 2035, significantly more than present levels. Most analysts anticipate that even the 2% threshold may be increased or made obligatory. Europeans will also intensify collective defence initiatives.
The EU’s Strategic Compass foresees new quick-response forces and shared procurement of ammunition and drones. The European Defence Fund has begun to finance collaborative development of weapons so that European militaries depend less on American hardware. Similarly, intelligence sharing and anti-hybrid frameworks will grow (between the EU and NATO, and with allies in Eastern Europe). The idea of strategic autonomy – being militarily capable without sole dependence on Washington – has become more pressing (although U.S. commitment continues to be firm under the Biden administration). On the energy side, policy is moving toward complete independence from Russian supply.
By the late 2020s, the EU plans to import effectively no Russian oil or gas, and to have strong substitutes for nuclear fuel and coal. Critical infrastructure (energy grids, pipelines, submarine cables) will be more robust and redundantly managed by EU member countries. Election protection and cybersecurity expenditures will remain higher – the EU already spent hundreds of millions on cyber defence under the Digital Europe Programme. Politically, the war’s teachings will persist.
The EU has again and again asserted Ukraine’s European future and that accession talks could begin in a couple of years. Among NATO allies, the post-2022 trend of regarding Russia and China as collective strategic competitors appears to persist.
China’s part (e.g. strengthening relations with Russia) introduces an additional layer, but Moscow is the current focus. Notably, the memory of these crises has changed European popular opinion. Many citizens now consider strong national defences and even conscription to be required, rather than unpopular ideas a decade ago. In short, Russia’s geopolitical policy – particularly the application of force in Europe’s neighbourhood – has acted as a catalyst for the continent to rethink its security stance fundamentally.
European countries are investing more in their military, consolidating EU and NATO-level defence planning, and diversifying away from Russian supplies and energy sources. The system of alliances itself has become more robust (with new members and commitments), while European political cohesion – if imperfect – has remained solid in defending Ukraine. These trends are likely to solidify into new norms: a militarily more powerful, technologically more robust, and less Moscow-dependent Europe than before. European security policy in the future will therefore prioritise deterrence and resilience, with the policies of Russia as the background context for these priorities.
Article by Shaloo