When Pakistan’s foreign minister and deputy prime minister, Ishaq Dar, landed in Dhaka on August 23, 2025, it was the first visit by a Pakistani foreign minister in 13 years. Islamabad billed the trip as “historic” and the start of a “reinvigorated partnership” with Bangladesh. That intense diplomatic push is not a one-off photo-op – it reflects a deeper strategic calculation in Islamabad and a radically altered landscape in Dhaka. During a welcoming ceremony in Dhaka, Bangladesh’s Foreign Secretary received Dar on the tarmac.
Pakistan’s Deputy PM and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar was being received in Dhaka on 23 August 2025. The visit, the first by a Pakistani foreign minister in 13 years, opened a new chapter of engagement between the two countries.
During this trip, Dar and Bangladeshi officials signed multiple pacts. These included an official visa waiver for diplomatic and official passports, and MoUs on trade cooperation, joint economic working groups, and collaboration between strategic studies institutes and news agencies.
A cultural exchange program and a knowledge corridor (with scholarships and training) were also launched. Dar conveyed greetings from Pakistan’s Prime Minister and underscored Islamabad’s “strong desire” to build a forward-looking partnership with Bangladesh.
In parallel, Pakistan’s Commerce Minister Jam Kamal Khan visited Dhaka in August 2025. He and Bangladesh’s commerce adviser Sheikh Bashiruddin agreed to set up joint commissions on trade and investment. They noted that Bangladesh’s imports from Pakistan in FY2024–25 at $787M far exceeded Bangladesh’s exports to Pakistan at $78M, and vowed to narrow this gap.
The revived Joint Economic Commission (last held in 2005) met at Dhaka by late October: Bangladesh offered reduced duties on Pakistani textiles and promised to form working groups; Pakistan counter-offered the Karachi port scheme and cut its 2% jute duty to help Bangladeshi exports.
A Post-Hasina Opening Pakistan Can’t Ignore
For nearly 16 years, relations were frosty under Sheikh Hasina, whose Awami League government kept 1971 front and center, pressed Pakistan on an apology for war crimes, and aligned closely with India on security issues. The interim government has signaled a more “balanced” foreign policy, loosening the near-automatic tilt towards New Delhi and showing readiness to re-engage with both Pakistan and China.
For Pakistan, long isolated in South Asia and locked in hostile ties with India and a transactional relationship with Afghanistan, a friendlier Dhaka is a rare geopolitical prize.
Shared Concerns About India – But Not a Simple “Axis”
In May 2025, India and Pakistan fought a brief but intense four-day aerial war following a deadly attack in Pahalgam, Kashmir. For many in Islamabad, that episode confirmed India’s willingness to apply “hard power” in the region.
Bangladesh, meanwhile, has seen its own frictions with India from trade and tariff disputes to public resentment over perceived Indian interference and the end of some transit facilities. Pakistani officials and analysts openly frame the thaw with Dhaka as part of a search for “balance of power” in South Asia rather than an anti-India bloc.
Dhaka, however, is still cautious. The interim government insists it does not view Pakistan through a purely security lens and wants to prioritise economics and connectivity over geopolitical “camp politics”.
The China Factor: A Triangular Realignment
China is the quiet third player in this reset. Beijing is Pakistan’s closest strategic partner and a major investor in Bangladesh through Belt and Road projects and infrastructure loans.
Bangladesh continues to court Chinese support Yunus visited Beijing in March 2025, followed by the army chief’s week-long visit in August, and Dhaka is considering the purchase of Chinese J-10C fighter jets, which Pakistan already flies. That creates a shared military ecosystem in which Chinese hardware, training and doctrine could knit the two countries’ forces closer together.
For Pakistan, then, warmer ties with Bangladesh help anchor a China-friendly arc on India’s eastern flank. For Bangladesh, engagement with Pakistan is one way to diversify its options and avoid over-dependence on any single great power, including both India and China.
Bangladesh-Pakistan Relations – Trade, Connectivity and the Economics of Rapprochement
Behind the symbolism lies a very practical agenda. Bangladesh has been one of South Asia’s fastest-growing economies, averaging around 6 percent growth since 2021; Pakistan, by contrast, has struggled to reach even 2.5 percent.
Current bilateral trade is tiny roughly $661 million in Pakistani exports to Bangladesh versus just $57 million in imports in 2024, according to Pakistani and Bangladeshi officials. Yet the complementarities are obvious:
- Bangladesh needs cotton, yarn, cement, food products and fertilizers all sectors where Pakistan is competitive.
- Pakistan could import jute, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and light industrial goods from Bangladesh’s export-oriented industries.
Dar’s visit and subsequent talks have pushed forward several economic steps: visa exemptions for officials, plans to resume direct shipping and flights, and the creation of business councils and trade commissions. For Pakistan, gaining access even indirectly to Bangladesh’s booming garment and manufacturing ecosystem is especially attractive at a time when its own textile exports face headwinds.
Bangladesh-Pakistan Defense Relations
The diplomatic track has been matched by an uptick in military contacts. Senior Bangladeshi army and navy officers visited Pakistan in early 2025, while Pakistani generals held talks in Dhaka and with Bangladeshi officers visiting Islamabad.
On the surface, these are routine courtesy calls and training exchanges. But taken together, they signal that both sides are exploring defence cooperation from officer training and doctrine sharing to possible joint exercises or arms deals. That carries obvious implications for India, which has traditionally been Dhaka’s primary defence partner. Analysts in New Delhi already warn that a Pakistan-Bangladesh reset “carries big risks for India” by chipping away at its once-comfortable influence in Dhaka.
So, Why the Rush From Pakistan’s Side?
Taken together, Pakistan’s diplomatic charm offensive towards Bangladesh is driven by several overlapping motives: Strategic relief from isolation, economic opportunity, China-centric alignment, and Narrative and legitimacy.
Whether this bet pays off will depend less on warm communiqués and more on hard questions: Can Pakistan and Bangladesh find a way to compartmentalise, or genuinely address, historical grievances? Can Dhaka ensure that engagement doesn’t translate into greater space for extremist actors? And can both states manage India’s and China’s competing anxieties without becoming pawns?
Pakistan is rushing to mend fences because the regional chessboard is shifting – and a newly fluid Bangladesh is, for once, a square Islamabad thinks it can actually win. Whether Dhaka ultimately shares that enthusiasm, and at what cost, is still very much an open question.
Article by Shaloo Singh