In recent months, Bangladesh has faced a confluence of challenges that observers note closely mirror problems long familiar in neighboring Pakistan. Widespread street unrest in mid-2024 toppled the Awami League government, after which the military moved into a central governance role. Reports of growing religious intolerance and attacks on minorities have spiked.
Elections past and planned have been plagued by allegations of coercion, boycotts, and one-party dominance. Economically, Bangladesh’s foreign reserves have slumped and the country is seeking major IMF support, even as it leans heavily on Chinese loans and investments.
Military Influence in Politics and Governance in Bangladesh
The 2024 protests that swept Bangladesh included large student rallies demanding an end to quota systems, alongside arrests and shootings by security forces. These demonstrations escalated when demonstrators stormed the ruling party headquarters in Dhaka in early August, leading Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to resign and flee the country in a military helicopter. Within hours, Army Chief Gen. Waker-uz-Zaman announced an interim government.
Thousands had defied a nationwide curfew and stormed Hasina’s official residence as curbs tightened on the protests. The military’s swift takeover – ostensibly to restore order – marks a stark turn from Bangladesh’s recent history of civilian rule. Analysts say the army now sees itself as “the guardian of Bangladesh’s politics”.
Since August 2024, General Waker and other generals have worked closely with Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, the interim prime minister, on a transition plan. Yunus’s government insists it is temporary; early elections have been promised, now slated for April 2026. Yet observers note an unusually prominent military hand in administration.
Rights groups report continued crackdowns that mirror patterns of the past: during the 2007–2008 caretaker government (also army-backed), security forces acted with impunity, and analysts warn similar dynamics may be unfolding now. Indeed, recent commentary describes an emerging “cold war” between the interim civilian leaders and the armed forces over policy direction.
Officially, the military denies any rift – an army spokesperson stated that “we are working harmoniously” with the government – but many Bangladeshis see the uniformed services calling the shots.
This pattern closely echoes Pakistan’s history, where generals have routinely intervened in politics (e.g. coups in 1958, 1977, 1999) or governed through proxy administrations. In Bangladesh, the army’s willingness to depose a democratically elected prime minister (as occurred in 1975 and briefly in 2007) signals a new era of military influence.
Some analysts note that while the current army rulers publicly promise a quick return to civilian democracy, they will likely entrench themselves behind the scenes. As one expert commented, Bangladesh’s military “may have limited appetite to stay in power” long-term, but its recent actions show it is a decisive power-broker. The net effect is that the military has moved from a mostly behind-the-scenes role into open governance – a situation that Pakistani leaders have endured for decades.
Religious Intolerance and Islamist Extremism
Since the political upheaval, Bangladesh has also seen a worrisome surge in religious intolerance. Human Rights Watch reports that, amid the current transition, mobs influenced by “extremist Islam” have begun targeting religious minorities – notably Hindus and Ahmadis – as well as secular Awami League supporters.
Rights groups say hundreds of incidents of violence against Hindus have occurred in the past year (one Bangladeshi rights NGO documented 45 murders, mostly of Hindus, between mid-2023 and mid-2024), and community leaders report mass displacement.
A recent feature in Al Jazeera describes rural Hindu villages where residents live in fear: “anti-Hindu religious activists… now are in strength,” after being long repressed under Hasina. Business and temples have been vandalized, and families forcibly evicted from ancestral lands.
International observers are alarmed that Islamist militants appear to be emboldened. A report by a UK parliamentary group found evidence that hardline extremist factions have “gained ground” since August 2024 and recorded over 2,000 “atrocities” in the period following Hasina’s fall. Prominent commentators argue Bangladesh is sliding into “Islamist violence” and could become a new “flash point” of sectarian unrest in South Asia.
By year-end 2024, even the interim government’s critics noted a radical shift: a former Awami minister now in exile warned that the post-August violence was “sheer brutality” and marked a campaign to remove “secularism” from the constitution.
These developments recall Pakistan’s own struggles with Islamist militancy and sectarian attacks. In Pakistan, radical groups and religious extremists have long challenged the state’s control; now Bangladesh faces a similar threat environment.
Bangladesh’s majority Muslim population has historically coexisted with minorities under a secular constitution, but observers now worry that Bangladesh may lose its pluralistic character if the new regime does not firmly curb extremist forces. Human rights organizations insist that protecting minorities must become a priority for the interim government, lest communal polarisation worsen.
Erosion of Democratic Norms and Electoral Credibility
On the political front, Bangladesh’s democratic institutions have come under intense strain. Freedom House’s 2024 report rated Bangladesh only “Partly Free,” noting that the ruling Awami League had consolidated power by “sustained harassment of the opposition… and critical media”. The rights watchdog documented rampant legal abuses by Awami security forces even before the 2024 protests.
For example, in the run-up to a planned January 2024 election, the opposition BNP and dozens of allied parties boycotted the polls en masse, protesting what they saw as a rigged process. Reports from that time describe “dummy” independent candidates run by the Awami Party to create the appearance of competition.
Tens of thousands of BNP activists were arrested, and at least 11 were killed in street clashes, prompting foreign governments to impose sanctions on election officials. Even the repressive Digital Security Act was replaced by a similarly harsh Cybersecurity Law, alarming free-speech advocates.
In sum, Bangladesh’s pre-2024 elections and politics had already developed features of an “electoral charade,” with widespread reports of vote-rigging and coercion. The January 2024 vote, held without the BNP, did little to improve credibility. As one analyst put it, Sheikh Hasina’s long rule was “marked by allegations of authoritarianism, targeting of the opposition, [and] large-scale vote rigging”. In that sense, Bangladesh’s democracy was eroding even before the army’s intervention.
Since the government change, concerns about authoritarian practices have intensified under the interim regime. Early on, the new government banned the Awami League – one of the country’s two major parties – and began charging Hasina and other leaders with crimes related to the protest violence.
In just a few months hundreds of officials, journalists, lawyers and academics have been arrested or charged. A UK parliamentary report observed evidence that “murder charges” and other prosecutions are being used against former ministers and judges “in such numbers to raise questions around their credibility”. International rights groups warn that using the courts as a political weapon undermines the rule of law, just as Pakistan’s own courts have sometimes been used to sideline political figures.
The interim government insists it is rooting out corruption and abuse, but critics say the timing of many charges suggests vengeance, not justice. For now, Bangladesh is caught between its history of competitive elections and this new reality of politicized justice.
With fresh elections promised for April 2026, observers will watch closely whether the process is genuinely free and fair. Until then, the political climate – with opposition leaders jailed and media restrictions tightened – risks cementing an authoritarian turn akin to what has been seen in Pakistan’s past.
Geopolitical Alignment: Bangladesh Embracing China
Like Pakistan, which for decades has been a strategic ally of China, Bangladesh is rapidly deepening ties with Beijing. Since the early 2010s, China has poured billions into Bangladeshi infrastructure under its Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese leaders often promote Bangladesh as a key partner on the Bay of Bengal.
In March 2025, interim Premier Muhammad Yunus made his first overseas trip to China, not to neighboring India, signaling a shift in Dhaka’s diplomatic focus. Chinese President Xi Jinping used the visit to reaffirm massive economic support: China agreed to consider cutting interest rates on Bangladeshi loans and pledged to expand investments in Bangladeshi industry. Yunus announced that China had committed roughly $2.1 billion in new loans, grants and investments for Bangladesh.
Many of these funds are earmarked for strategic projects. For example, a $400 million Chinese deal will modernize Mongla Port (Bangladesh’s second-largest seaport), and China is increasing its role in the Teesta River water project – moves that India views with alarm given the geographical chokepoint of the adjacent “Chicken’s Neck” corridor.
Analysts caution that this embrace of China carries risks. Even before 2024, Beijing had pledged some $40 billion in Bangladeshi projects, though only a fraction (around $7 billion) had been disbursed. Many Chinese loans come with higher interest rates (around 3%) than Western alternatives. The Atlantic Council notes that Bangladesh must remain vigilant to avoid the “debt trap” seen in some other countries – for example, by diversifying partners and ensuring projects are viable.
At the same time, Bangladesh cannot ignore its giant neighbor India. For decades Dhaka balanced its China relations against those with India, but under the interim government this “tightrope” may be ending. Yunus’s team is also reaching out to the United States and other Western partners – seeking energy deals, satellite links and tariff concessions – to offset Chinese influence.
In short, Bangladesh’s foreign policy is in flux. The current trajectory resembles Pakistan’s: heavy Chinese investment in infrastructure (similar to Pakistan’s China-Pakistan Economic Corridor), even as both Islamabad and Dhaka try to placate their largest export market (the United States) and regional powers. How Dhaka manages these relationships – avoiding overdependence on Beijing while maintaining essential ties with India and the West – will shape whether its path diverges from or parallels Pakistan’s geopolitical challenges.
Economic Pressures: Falling Reserves and IMF Aid
Economically, Bangladesh’s outlook has dimmed considerably. Growth has slowed sharply in the wake of political unrest: IMF staff report Bangladesh’s GDP growth fell to just about 3.3% year-on-year in the first half of FY 2024–25 (June–December 2024), down from over 5% the year before. This deceleration reflects the disruptions of the protests and crackdown, as well as tighter monetary policy. Inflation, which had surged to 11.7% in mid-2024, remains in the high single digits (around 9–10% in early 2025) – far above the central bank’s 5–6% comfort range.
These strains have drained Bangladesh’s foreign-exchange buffers. As of May 2025, gross reserves stood at only $25.7 billion, roughly $1.5 billion lower than a year earlier. On an IMF (BPM6) basis, usable reserves were even smaller – about $20.5 billion. The gap between import cover and low reserves has prompted alarm.
In the April 2025 IMF mission statement, the staff warned of a “sharp widening” of the current-account deficit and a “rapid decline of foreign exchange reserves”. They urged stronger fiscal consolidation and a more flexible exchange rate to help rebuild reserves and restore confidence.
To fill financing gaps, Bangladesh has turned to external creditors – just as Pakistan frequently does. In January 2023 Dhaka secured a $4.7 billion IMF package (through Extended Credit and Resilience Funds) to shore up its economy. Since then, several tranches have been released, but more help is needed. The interim finance ministry expects around $3.3 billion of new external financing (from IMF, World Bank, ADB and others) by June 2025.
That includes staff-level agreement on additional IMF disbursements. Meanwhile, policy changes (like raising bank interest rates and pursuing tax reforms) are planned to broaden revenue. According to the IMF, tight monetary policy and fiscal prudence are essential in the near term to contain inflation and stop capital flight.
These developments mirror Pakistan’s economic travails. Like Islamabad, Dhaka is grappling with declining reserves, high debt and the need for IMF bailouts. Both countries also run large trade deficits, in part because they import energy and rely on external borrowing. Bangladesh has some advantages – its garment exports and remittance inflows are still strong – but its creditors are increasingly wary.
The World Bank and IMF have urged Dhaka to avoid risky lending and to ensure debt remains sustainable. If Bangladesh fails to enact structural reforms, analysts warn, it could face debt distress similar to Pakistan’s (which contracted a $3 billion IMF program in 2023 under comparable circumstances).
Conclusion
Bangladesh’s recent trajectory indeed reflects many of the issues that have long challenged Pakistan. An assertive military in power, a fracturing political landscape, rising sectarianism, alignment with China, and looming debt are all now on Bangladesh’s agenda. The parallels – not mere coincidences – serve as a warning: unchecked power, whether military or religious, can corrode democratic norms and economic stability.
Yet Bangladesh’s situation is not identical to Pakistan’s. Its economy has been more robust in recent years, and its political culture has elements of secularism and civil-society strength that might resist a full slide into authoritarianism. Moreover, the interim leaders have publicly committed to an electoral transition and reform agenda.
Still, observers stress that only concrete steps (such as ensuring a free vote in 2026, protecting minorities, and managing loans prudently) will convince Bangladeshi citizens and partners that the country is not doomed to Pakistan’s fate. For now, Bangladesh’s course is very much the subject of debate and international scrutiny – and its outcomes remain to be seen.
Article by Shaloo Singh