Pakistan’s political and economic fragility is the product of decades of military rule, ideological politics, and external interventions. From its founding, Pakistan struggled with contested ideology and governance. Military coups after 1958 entrenched generals in power, while successive regimes courted Islamist clergy to legitimize their rule. Under General Zia ul-Haq (1977–1988) in particular, the army aligned with conservative religious parties to “legitimize [its] regime,” institutionalizing a hardline Islamic agenda and empowering radical clerics. This Islamization enriched madrassa networks and militant groups at the expense of secular institutions.
For example, Zia formalized mandatory zakat (charity) levies to channel funds into madrasas, and the Afghan war brought millions of refugees and Saudi/Gulf donations into Pakistan’s religious schools. Meanwhile, chronic debt and corruption starved public services: by 2001 Pakistan spent only about 2% of GDP on education (one of the world’s lowest rates) and government schools were notoriously dilapidated or “ghost” institutions. In this void of state capacity, militant madrassas flourished, many teaching extremist ideologies (a mix of imported Wahhabi doctrine and militant Deobandi thought) rather than basic literacy or skills.
Economically, Pakistan has cycled through recurrent crises. With few natural resources and frequent political turmoil, it has required IMF rescue funds almost continually. One analysis notes that since 1958 Pakistan has taken an IMF bailout roughly every third year. By the 1990s and 2000s, fiscal mismanagement, expensive sanctions after nuclear tests (1998), and sporadic growth left the economy weak. In 2019, before the latest crises, 21.9% of Pakistanis lived below the national poverty line, and by 2024 World Bank data suggest that figure surged to 25.3% amid pandemic, floods, and inflation.
Chronic budget deficits led to the 2024–25 IMF Extended Fund Facility (the country’s 25th since 1958), and as of mid-2025 inflation had only recently been tamed by steep economic reforms. Through all these cycles, Pakistan’s civilian institutions remained weak and militarized. The army and intelligence services accumulated economic holdings and political clout, while elected governments often relied on religious hardliners for popular support.
Cold War and U.S. Involvement in the 1980s
Pakistan’s vulnerability was leveraged by the United States during the Cold War. In the 1980s, Islamabad became the main conduit for CIA aid to Afghan mujahideen fighting the Soviets. With two million Afghan refugees on its soil, Pakistan (“a U.S. stalking horse,” in the words of one human rights report) was granted “wide discretion” to channel an estimated $2–3 billion of covert U.S. assistance to Afghan fighters. Pakistan’s ISI trained and armed over 80,000 mujahideen during that war. At the same time, the Afghan jihad popularized militant Islam and brought a flood of donations from Gulf charities into Pakistani mosques and seminaries.
Many new madrassas (religious schools) sprang up in this era, funded largely by Saudi and Gulf benefactors. A Brookings analysis notes that during the 1980s “thousands of new madrassas were formed” with foreign donations, combining Wahabi and Deobandi curriculum. Among their students were fighters who would later join the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Indeed, commentators observe that “many of the Taliban were educated in Saudi-financed madrassas in Pakistan that teach Wahhabism,” reflecting how Gulf and U.S.-backed jihad efforts radicalized a generation.
In return for Pakistan’s cooperation, the U.S. valued Islamabad’s strategic location. American planners viewed Pakistan as the gateway for influencing South and Central Asia. During the Afghan war (and later in the global “War on Terror”), Pakistan provided bases, intelligence channels, and supply lines to U.S. forces.
Its nuclear arsenal also became a factor: Islamabad’s atomic deterrent against India removed the risk of a South Asian war drawing in the superpowers. In short, Pakistan’s military and geographic position made it a key U.S. partner against Soviet (and later jihadist) threats, even as Pakistan’s generals continued to use Islamist proxies for their own ends.
Strategic Significance: U.S. and Chinese Interests
Today Pakistan remains a linchpin in great-power rivalry. For Washington, Pakistan sits astride Afghanistan and India – conflict-prone neighbors – and hosts nuclear weapons on one of the world’s most dangerous borders. During the 2001–2021 Afghanistan campaign, Pakistani territory was crucial for logistics and diplomatic engagement with the Taliban. U.S. officials also contend with Islamabad on counterterrorism and nuclear-security issues.
Overall, the U.S. has treated Pakistan as a strategic asset despite recurring mistrust, helping preserve the military’s dominance in policy and economy. (Human Rights Watch has documented how Pakistani generals essentially directed the Taliban as a proxy force while channeling U.S. aid.)
China’s interest in Pakistan is even more explicit. Islamabad is the fulcrum of Beijing’s “All-Weather” alliance and its Belt-and-Road ambitions. The $62 billion China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) links China’s western regions to the Arabian Sea. Chinese analysts highlight that CPEC “provides China the shortest and quickest access to the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf”. Through Gwadar Port in Pakistan’s Balochistan, China gains a strategic deep-water harbor overlooking Hormuz and the Indian Ocean – a valuable outlet for energy imports and a potential naval foothold.
Indeed, a CSIS study notes Gwadar’s transfer to Chinese control (for 40 years) and its role in projecting “Chinese power in the Indian Ocean Region”. In return, China pours investment and loans into Pakistan’s power plants, roads and military industries. Pakistan willingly cedes influence to Beijing; Chinese personnel reportedly number in the tens of thousands on CPEC projects, and China even helps fund Pakistan’s largest energy plants (on terms favoring Chinese investors). Overall, China treats Pakistan as a gateway to South Asia and the Middle East – a counterweight against India and a corridor for Chinese trade and military reach.
Regional Players: Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States
Pakistan’s weakness has also been exploited by regional Muslim powers. Turkey, with shared Islamic-ideological ties, has deepened its alliance with Pakistan to bolster its own influence. Turkish arms firms now supply Pakistan extensively – Ankara is reportedly Islamabad’s second-largest arms vendor, providing advanced drones and ships. Joint projects abound: Pakistan and Turkey co-produce naval corvettes and fighter jets, while Turkey gains market access to Pakistani defense and energy sectors.
Strategically, Turkey sees Pakistan as a fraternal partner that helps it balance rivals: Erdogan’s government has positioned itself against Gulf monarchies (Saudi/UAE) and thus cultivates ties with non-Arab Muslim states like Pakistan. Through high-level summits and trade agreements (e.g. aiming to quintuple bilateral trade), Turkey leverages Pakistan’s needs for investment and technology to expand its own regional reach.
The Arab Gulf has been even more directly transactional. Rich monarchies have historically recruited and financed Pakistan’s military manpower. Carnegie research finds that Gulf armies rely heavily on Pakistani contract soldiers: for example, Pakistani nationals constitute about 18% of Bahrain’s air force and over 10,000 serve in Bahrain’s security forces. Pakistanis have also staffed Saudi and Emirati forces: in the late 1980s tens of thousands served in the Saudi military, often in support roles.
While these soldiers bring income home, their exposure to hardline Wahhabi doctrine has fed back into Pakistan’s religious politics. In recent years, the Gulf has leveraged financial aid and oil supplies to extract policy support. For example, Riyadh has periodically provided Pakistan with $3 billion cash infusions and multi-year cheap-oil facilities to prop up its balance of payments. These lifelines often come with strings: Islamabad has altered its diplomatic positions (e.g. pulling out of a 2019 Kuala Lumpur Muslim leadership summit) under Gulf pressure.
By mid-2025 Pakistan’s budget explicitly counted on receiving some $6.5 billion from Saudi Arabia (mostly deposits and oil credits) and another $4.4 billion from China for FY 2025–26. Meanwhile, Pakistani workers in the Gulf send home a quarter of all remittances (Saudi migrants alone sent $7.4 billion in 2024). Thus, Gulf and Chinese largesse has effectively bought them enormous influence over Pakistan’s economy and policies, deepening Islamabad’s dependency.
Domestic Priorities: Defense vs. Development
Pakistan’s own budgetary choices further reflect this exploitation. Successive governments have sacrificed social spending to prop up the military. In FY2025, defence outlays reached roughly 2.3% of GDP – higher than China or India’s ratios – while education and healthcare budgets have languished at only about 2% and 1–1.5% of GDP respectively. Even as the economy wobbled, Islamabad twice hiked military spending: after a 2025 border crisis it raised the defence budget by 20%, to nearly ₹2.55 trillion (about 1.97% of GDP).
In fact, over the last five years Pakistan “nearly doubled” its military budget while cutting overall spending. One analysis notes that defence grew at an average 12.6% per year between 2017 and 2025, dwarfing the 8% growth in India’s military budget. By contrast, social sectors are squeezed: in 2025 education will still receive only about 2% of GDP and health just ~1.3%. This imbalance persists despite urgent social needs; critics observe that federal budgets often trim schools and hospitals to afford new weapons. IMF and analysts repeatedly warn that Pakistan’s unsustainably high defence spending (now doubled from a few years ago) must give way to reforms, but militarized interests remain entrenched.
Social Vulnerabilities: Poverty, Unemployment, and Radicalization
The net result is a Pakistani society under immense strain. As of 2024, roughly a quarter of the population lives in poverty. Millions of young people are jobless: national unemployment stands at 6–7%, but youth unemployment (age 15–24) is over 11%. Rural underemployment and a skills shortage further limit opportunities. These economic pressures feed social discontent. One UN security report warned that “poverty, ignorance and weak family ties” create a “fertile ground” for extremist recruiters.
In Pakistan many disenfranchised youths find identity and income in madrassas and militant groups. Surveys and studies have documented an “enabling environment” for radicalization: thousands of Pakistanis have died in terrorism, and sizable segments of society (especially where state services failed) either sympathize with or tolerate extremist narratives. The combination of ideological schooling, family or tribal affiliations, and economic need pushes some into militancy. As a Pakistan analyst notes, some radical “grassroots movements”, often with clerical backing, helped polarize society when state education and welfare collapsed.
Meanwhile, public health and education outcomes languish. Only a small fraction of GDP goes to schools and clinics, leaving millions without basic literacy or healthcare. Illiteracy and poverty breed desperation. With few civilian jobs or welfare programs, many young Pakistanis feel “dead-end” lives. This vacuum of opportunity and the moral authority ceded to clerics provide fertile recruiting ground for radical groups.
A UN Security Council debate bluntly noted that terrorist groups prey on “the feeling of exclusion” among young people. In Pakistan, these dynamics are stark: UN surveys show that even children in some areas view violence as justifiable if they feel oppressed. In short, the very weaknesses of Pakistan’s institutions – cultivated by military rule and foreign meddling – have left its people vulnerable to further manipulation.
Conclusion
Pakistan’s chronic weakness has made it a target of strategic exploitation. Wealthy patrons and great powers have long treated Pakistan as a pliable ally: the U.S. for Cold War and counterterrorism purposes, China for economic corridors and naval access, Turkey for ideological camaraderie, and Gulf states for manpower and regional posturing. In return for support (often motivated by others’ agendas), Pakistan has surrendered policy autonomy and social development.
Every infusion of foreign cash or contract soldiers has reinforced the military’s role and the clerics’ influence, often exacerbating the very problems those patrons claimed to help solve. Today, with near-term progress still hostage to IMF programs and geo-strategic competitions, Pakistan remains trapped in this cycle of dependency.
Its strategic location and nuclear arsenal keep it at the center of regional power games, but at the human level, the Pakistani poor and youth bear the brunt. As one analysis warns, unless Pakistan invests in its people (education, health, jobs) rather than perceptual defense and ideological exports, it will continue to be “fed” to meet others’ agendas – a tragic irony given that its population’s welfare must be the foundation of any real security.
Article by Shaloo Singh