President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan insists that Turkey’s 1980 coup-era constitution is outdated and needs replacement. He has vowed to draft a “new civilian and libertarian constitution” by “civilians, not coup plotters” and publicly claims the reform is for the nation’s benefit rather than his own. Critics, however, argue that Erdoğan’s push is a thinly-veiled effort to extend his rule, as he would be ineligible for another term after 2028.
Ruling party spokesmen openly suggest that a fourth term is on their agenda “if the people desire it,” while some suspect that Erdoğan’s recent outreach to Kurdish militants, such as brokering a PKK ceasefire, may be aimed at winning backing from the pro-Kurdish bloc to secure enough votes for constitutional change.
Proposed Constitutional Changes
No official draft of the new constitution has been released. Erdoğan has pledged that the country’s core founding principles – secularism, the unitary state, etc. – will not be altered. Beyond that assurance, concrete details are scarce. Observers widely expect that any revisions will primarily target presidential powers, notably the current term-limit clause that bars Erdoğan from running again in 2028.
The nationalist MHP leader has already called for amending the constitution to allow Erdoğan another term. Analysts suspect the new charter could further concentrate authority in the presidency by codifying executive practices like expanded emergency rule and granting the president greater appointment powers. In short, any reforms are likely to benefit the executive rather than expand checks on it.
Impact on Democratic Institutions
The proposed overhaul would likely cement the near-absolute dominance of the executive. Under Turkey’s current presidential system (established in 2017), the president already heads the executive without a prime minister, can issue executive decrees, and can dissolve Parliament at will. Parliament today cannot easily remove the president or effectively scrutinize cabinet ministers, and many legislative powers were curtailed in 2017.
The EU’s 2024 progress report notes that this system has reinforced executive power concentration, significantly weakened institutional checks and balances, and curtailed political pluralism. Any new constitution is likely to entrench these changes further.
Critics worry that parliamentary authority would remain negligible, as ministers can be chosen from outside Parliament and no-vote procedures still allow the president to rule by decree. Likewise, judicial independence would remain undermined. Since 2016, Turkey has purged thousands of judges and prosecutors and placed judicial appointments under a government-controlled council. The high judicial board is dominated by Erdoğan’s party and appointees, making courts susceptible to political direction.
A new constitution could simply codify this power structure, leaving the judiciary unable to serve as a genuine check. In sum, institutions that normally restrain power – Parliament, courts, ombudsmen – are already very weak, and the reforms appear poised to reinforce the executive’s primacy.
Civil Liberties, Judiciary, and Media Freedom
Turkey’s civil liberties are already sorely restricted, and a new constitution is not likely to enhance them. Independent media barely exist, with the majority of mainstream channels belonging to pro-government interests and opposition channels subject to regular fines, shutdowns, or takeovers. Editors and reporters are regularly imprisoned on charges such as “terrorism propaganda” or “insulting the president,” and a number of foreign media have been banned from transmission.
Dozens of journalists were arrested or prosecuted in 2024, and Turkey is consistently among the worst jailers of journalists in the world. Social media is strictly regulated by law: in 2022, even a “disinformation” law criminalizes the sharing of “false information” online. Protesters and opposition voices are frequently prosecuted on loose anti-terror laws.
Judicial independence is similarly compromised. Judges who rule against the government are frequently reassigned or dismissed, while those who uphold its interests are promoted. In short, the space for civil society, dissent, and a free press has already shrunk dramatically.
A new constitution stressing a strong presidency would likely offer few new protections for rights and could even legitimize the existing state of emergency powers. NGOs warn that without strengthening civil liberties, the reforms would simply ratify the status quo of repression.
Efforts to silence opposition have already provoked public backlash. The arrest in March 2025 of Istanbul’s Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu (a leading Erdoğan rival) set off nationwide rallies. Masses of citizens chanted pro-democracy slogans in Turkey’s largest anti-government protests since 2013. T
Participants included students, secularists, nationalists, and even former AKP loyalists united by a call for just politics. The government reacted with repression: police unleashed water cannons, tear gas, and rubber bullets to scatter the protesters, and over 1,100 individuals had been arrested by late March in the course of the demonstrations.
Leaders of the opposition were arrested (with charges generally considered politically motivated), and top social media accounts were blocked. They highlight the danger of instability: most Turks believe “there is nothing left to lose” if there are no avenues left through which change can be brought about legally.
Key domestic risks include:
- Authoritarian entrenchment: By codifying Erdoğan’s expanded powers, the reforms could firmly concentrate authority in one person and party, marking a shift toward full authoritarian rule. Erdoğan already exercises control over the media and judges and routinely uses the courts to sideline rivals.
- Civil unrest: The recent protests show that many citizens are willing to demonstrate for democracy. If constitutional changes are enacted without consensus, large-scale protests could recur. Hundreds of thousands have already rallied, and over a thousand have been detained within days of İmamoğlu’s arrest. Any perception that reform is a power grab risks fueling further street resistance.
- Radicalization: Excluding major segments of society could push some toward extremism. Renewed persecution of Kurdish political figures or secular dissenters might alienate their communities. Some analysts fear that when legal opposition is blocked, marginalized groups (including former militants) could revive conflict. While this outcome is uncertain, the closing off of peaceful outlets raises the stakes for volatile reactions.
International Impact: NATO, EU, and Regional Geopolitics
Turkey’s constitutional change will resonate beyond its borders. As a NATO ally with the alliance’s second-largest army, Turkey plays a pivotal strategic role. It has acted as a security intermediary – for example, hosting talks on Ukraine’s conflict – and controls critical geography such as the Bosphorus strait and borders with Syria and Iraq.
This geopolitical importance has created a dilemma for Europe. Any Western security framework must be underpinned by basic principles of democracy, justice, and accountability, but these are under attack in Turkey.
In practice, NATO allies have largely kept quiet about Erdoğan’s democratic backsliding, prioritizing defense cooperation and Turkish support for Ukraine over public criticism. Even Turkey’s ratification of Sweden’s NATO bid was linked to unrelated arms deals, showing how such transactions are negotiated in the broader security context.
With the European Union, ties are already strained. EU accession talks have been effectively frozen since 2018 over rule-of-law and human-rights concerns. The latest crackdown and high-profile arrests have reignited longstanding concerns in Europe about Turkey’s democratic trajectory. EU officials have so far limited themselves to expressions of concern and attention.
Brussels still engages Ankara on issues like migration, energy, and regional security, but on democracy it has little leverage. The EU has withheld incentives like visa-free travel or trade privileges that were conditioned on reforms. Any formal constitutional change that further concentrates power would likely deepen EU skepticism and could trigger statements of condemnation or even targeted sanctions by some member states.
Regionally, a more autocratic Turkey is expected to maintain its assertive foreign policy. Ankara has been deeply involved in the Libyan and Syrian conflicts, supported Azerbaijan against Armenia, and challenged Greek and Cypriot claims in the Eastern Mediterranean. A Turkey under Erdoğan will likely continue to play Russia, the U.S., and other powers off each other to its advantage. Analysts note that Turkey is viewed increasingly as a “necessary partner” by the EU for matters like migration control and energy, even if it is no longer seen as a prospective member.
In sum, the constitutional changes may have less effect on the balance of power in the region – Turkey will remain militarily and economically strong – but more effect on how European and American leaders publicly address Turkey. Allies may grumble privately, but strategic imperatives will temper any push for democratic reforms.
Instability or Authoritarian Consolidation
Looking ahead, analysts outline two broad scenarios. In one, Erdoğan’s camp succeeds in pushing through the new constitution, locking in a hyper-presidential system. This would formalize what many consider an emerging one-man rule. Scholars argue that Erdoğan’s recent moves – from rewriting local governments to jailing major opponents – represent another step toward full authoritarian rule.
In this scenario, Turkey would likely drift further from pluralistic democracy: dissent would be met with legal penalties, elections would offer limited competition, and the president’s party and allies would control virtually all levers of power. Such centralization may stabilize Erdoğan’s regime in the short term but create a brittle system, dependent on coercion rather than consent.
The alternate scenario is one of instability and conflict. If Erdoğan fails to secure constitutional change (for instance, if opposition parties block the referendum) or if he retreats under pressure, the current system could unravel. Protests could escalate, elite splits might emerge within the ruling coalition, and new elections could be forced. In this scenario, Erdoğan’s efforts to rewrite the constitution could ironically backfire by unifying a fragmented opposition.
Either way, the coming months will be pivotal for Turkey’s democracy. Whether Turkey consolidates an authoritarian regime or faces mounting instability, the struggle over constitutional change is likely to define its political future – and test the resilience of its people and institutions.
Article by Shaloo Singh